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1 Heather DeHaan’s book, entitled Stalinist City Planning, is at first glance “only” a case
study of Nizhnii Novgorod. At second glance, however, it delivers exactly what the title
promises – not in the sense of an encompassing survey but as a well‑chosen approach
which enables the author to present a deep‑cutting and multifaceted analysis of the
functioning of city planning and planning in general in the Stalinist Soviet Union.
2 This achievement is partially due to the fact that Nizhnii Novgorod, which had a strong
industrial base and was thus greatly affected by the introduction of the first five‑year
plan, offers numerous insights into the complexities and dynamics of socialist urban
planning.  But,  as  DeHaan  stresses,  it  is  also  due  to  the  fact  that  at  the  time,  the
overarching planning ambition of the newly introduced Socialism was that the story of
Nizhnii Novgorod should share general lines with most Soviet cities. Yet, it is foremost
the meticulous, sharp and original analysis which DeHaan applies to her subject that
lifts this study far above a case study.
3 Throughout  her  study,  DeHaan  connects  her  findings  on  Nizhnii  Novgorod  to  the
general developments in the Soviet Union, e.g., shifts in Stalin’s political agenda, but
also  draws on recent  findings  in  the histories  of  planning and experts.  This  works
particularly  when  she  focuses  on  the  planner  Alexander  Platonovich Ivanitskii.
Ivanitskii came to Nizhnii Novgorod to put through the urban planning indicated in the
five‑year plan. He kept his ties with Moscow and also played an important role for
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urbanism and the training of urbanists in the Soviet Union. Educated before the First
World War, Ivanitskii believed that a scientific approach was the key to both solving
concrete urban problems and mediating potential conflicts with the political decision
makers.  At the same time,  he was perfectly prepared to embark on the vision of  a
socialist society as long as it would let him create the leeway necessary to put through
his plans. 
4 Next  to  embodying  “scientific  objectivism”  as  a  member  of  the  planning  elite,
Ivanitskii, as DeHaan makes clear, derived his power from two other factors: (1) the fact
that urbanism was key to the Soviet project of actually building socialism and (2) the
extreme urbanistic challenge of rapidly industrializing a city with insufficient urban
infrastructure. When Nizhnii Novgorod was renamed Gorky in 1932, it acquired high
symbolical relevance for the implementation of the new Soviet model. This also meant
dealing with the legacies of imperial Russia and integrating older spatial structures as
well  as older loyalties and beliefs.  More than once,  as DeHaan shows for numerous
telling conflicts, older spatial structures carried such meaning that they could not be
changed as easily as the new socialist decision makers had expected. 
5 In  analyzing  Ivanitskii’s  achievements  and  failures,  DeHaan  comes  to  a  number  of
noteworthy and new results. First, she is able to portray two cohorts of Soviet planners
in  depth  and  with  clear  contours.  The  senior  group,  personalized  by  Ivanitskii,
welcomed the opportunities of the new era even if its members were not convinced
Bolsheviks.  These  planners  saw and partially  grasped the  chance  to  have  the  state
apparatus at their disposal and make use of property and real estate that had hitherto
been in private  hands.  The use  of  urban change to  create  new societies  could also
combine  with  the  planners’  ethos.  But  these  planners  shared  a  very  clear
understanding of what could be achieved within the framework of a five‑year plan,
and,  what  is  more,  understood  that  planning  was  a  complex  mechanism  situated
between the political and the scientific level. In a convincing metaphor inspired by the
fact  that  the  planners  ascribed  needs  to  citizens,  DeHaan  compares  them  to
“omniscient narrators of a novel.”
6 The numerous problems these planners faced on the ground stemmed less from a lack
of expertise or manpower than from the constant lack of resources, local opposition
and  ambiguous  communications  from  Moscow.  With  the  example  of  the  so‑called
star‑city plan, which DeHaan discusses at some length, the diverging local and central
state interests, the constant underfunding of planners, and Ivanitskii’s ability to use
scientific ethos and pragmatism to meet the political demands of the party are well
illustrated.
7 Within the brief  period covered by DeHaan,  however,  a  noteworthy transformation
took place in the group of planning experts with the emergence of a new class of Soviet
professionals. More and more planners evoked science as a neutral arbiter to postpone
any action—as more research was allegedly needed—and thus avoided taking a position
in the increasingly repressive political climate of the 1930s. However, as DeHaan shows,
this  position  brought  politics  in  and  thus  indirectly  politicized  science.  DeHaan
provides  ample  evidence  of  how  the  older  values  of  professional  knowledge  and
scientific universalism gave way to the new identity of a younger generation. Unlike
their elders, the new planners, educated in Soviet times, did not embrace the ideology
of the new Soviet state for pragmatic and instrumental reasons. In this, they responded
to the growing uneasiness in the communist party. Only the younger experts had the
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credibility of being educated in the Bolshevik spirit. And they were able to respond to
the  party’s  wish  for  a  more  radical  and  more  socialist  class  of  professionals—the
“praktiki.”  This  was  felt  directly  in  Nizhnii  Novgorod  with  the  planner  Nikolai
Alekseevich Solofnenko. Solofnenko’s impact was based on a new, undeclared deal with
the Soviet system. Building on Stalin’s self‑description as “the architect of socialism,”
the younger planners now joined forces with the system in performing socialism in the
urban sphere rather than putting through scientific planning principles. In a certain
sense,  as DeHaan shows, this was a way of acknowledging the shortcomings on the
grounds of allegedly scientifically based planning and stressed the staging rather than
building of socialism. This,  on the surface,  included participatory elements as these
planners called on the citizens to legitimize action. While planners tried to transform
citizens  into  ‘cultured’  urban  dwellers  through  engaging  them  in  the  process  of
planning, city planning became a source of rights for the citizens. 
8 The theatre metaphors that DeHaan uses throughout her study are mostly convincing
as they capture the symbolic meaning of what was at stake: “the drama of building
socialism,”  a  drama  larger  than  the  citizens  and  planners  alike.  Cityscape  both
facilitated and resisted Soviet power, but clearly the city was the decisive set where the
new political system had to prove its workability and eventually, legitimacy. DeHaan
does not fall prey to describing the planners of both cohorts as almighty “demiurges”
using the authority that the state bestowed upon them. Rather, she demonstrates how
these  planners  had  to  function  in  and  were  often  victims  of  an  all‑encompassing
political system that lacked the very consistency which it claimed under the heading of
socialism.
9 DeHaan describes how the establishment of a new planning logic under socialism and
in  the  dynamics  of  the  developing  socialist  state  translated  into  new realities.  She
presents telling examples and analyses of how abstract representation of the socialist
order in the city became a substitute for not having realized a true socialist order, but
also for the socialist city that was never built. More and more, the city turned into a
stage  for  Stalin’s  power.  While  this  gave  central  place  to  the  planners,  DeHaan
describes it as a Faustian pact, whereby planners depended on political patronage more
than ever. Tellingly, after Stalin’s death, engineers replaced the planners in the central
function they held until the early 1950s. 
10 DeHaan’s work brings to the fore the mechanisms of how experts profited from the
enormous tasks set by the socialist project and became more and more dependent on
the political  trajectories of  this  project.  The planners’  dream of a “plan that might
represent and realize fixed, stable power that lay beyond contestation” was confronted
with  both  the  hardly  consistent  wielding  of  power  in  Moscow,  the  enormous
inefficiencies  and  the  subsequent  economic  crises  felt  in  Nizhnii  Novgorod.  It  is
symptomatic that many of the plans, in particular the grandiose schemes of the “red
planner” Solofnenko, remained impressive only on paper, while American specialists
from Ford and other companies deeply transformed Nizhnii Novgorod in the context of
US investment and disposal of experts.
11 All in all, DeHaan’s excellent study represents a most welcome contribution to a field
which is of great relevance both to the history of planning and urbanism, and of the
critical phase of the establishment of a socialist society in the Soviet Union. DeHaan
indeed delivers a history of Stalinist city planning and a new interpretation of planning
under socialism in general. This is not a simple story of the mechanics of power versus
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resistance  from  below,  but  rather  an  unfolding  of  how  planning  partially  scripted
citizens’ lives and was at the same time itself constantly changing forms against the
realities on the ground. Rarely before have we come so close to what planning actually
meant for the urban reality of the Soviet Union in the 1930s. At the same time, DeHaan
presents a story of ‘building socialism‘ in both the concrete and metaphorical sense.
For all these reasons, her results are of great relevance not only for historians of the
Soviet  Union  but  for  anyone  interested  in  the  role  of  planning,  urbanism  and  in
particular the ambivalence and multilayered dependencies of experts. 
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